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NOTES AND COMMENTS
(3) Exceptions
In order to insure a complete review of the trial court's action on
motions under G. S. 1-220, the following request and exceptions should
be considered: (1) a request that the trial judge find facts, with an ex-
ception if the request is refused, 32 (2) exceptions to individual findings
of fact,' 33 and (3) exceptions to conclusions of the judge as to surprise
or excusable neglect and meritorious defense.'3 4 Also, the question of
what is presented for review by the following exceptions should be
recognized. A "broadside" exception presents for review only the
question of whether or not the facts found by the judge support his
judgment. 135 A general exception to the findings of fact on which the
judgment of the trial court rests, i.e. "a shot at the covey," will not be
considered on appeal.'80 An exception to the judgment below presents
only two questions: Whether the facts found support the judgment and
whether errors of law appear on the face of the record.
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Trusts-Constructive Trust-Recovery of Proceeds of Wrongful
Disclosure of Confidential Information
Defendant, a geologist, was employed full time by the plaintiff to
secure and classify geological data for use in locating and acquiring oil
properties. The information was highly confidential. Upon discovery
that defendant had been divulging parts of this information to con-
federates, who through its use were able to secure valuable oil interests
for themselves and for defendant, an action was begun to impress a con-
structive trust on the interests thus secured. It was held that de-
fendant had breached his fiduciary duty to his employer in divulging
this information, and it was decreed that defendant and his confederates
held the interests and profits therefrom as constructive trustees for the
plaintiff.'
Defined broadly, a constructive trust is a remedial device used to
compel one who holds property wrongfully acquired or retained to
.
12 McLeod v. Gooch, 162 N. C. 122, 78 S. E. 4 (1913).
.
3 Radeker v. Royal Pines Park, Inc., 207 N. C. 209, 176 S. E. 285 (1934);
Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N. C. 147, 63 S. E. 2d 133 (1950). (Exceptions must be
to individual findings of fact, as a general exception to findings will not be con-
sidered on appeal.) See cases cited supra notes 121-124.
"' Southern Butane Gas Corp. v. Bullard, 232 N. C. 730, 62 S. E. 2d 335
(1950).
" Dillingham v. Blue Ridge Motors, 234 N. C. 171, 66 S. E. 2d 641 (1951).
"~O Perkins v. Sykes, 233 N. C. 147, 63 S. E. 2d 133 (1950).
"' Hanford v. McSwain, 230 N. C. 229, 53 S. E. 2d 84 (1949).
'Hunter v. Shell Oil Company, 198 F. 2d 485 (5th Cir. 1952) ; accord, Pratt
v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 100 F. 2d 833 (9th Cir. 1937), approved in 25 VA. L.
REv. 848 (1939) ; Ohio Oil Company v. Sharpe, 135 F. 2d 303 (5th Cir. 1943)
reversing 45 F. Supp. 969 (D. C. Okla. 1942), approved in 41 MIcE. L. REv.
747 (1943).
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transfer it to the one who is entitled to it.' It no longer obtains of
doubt that this remedy will be used against one who has acquired
property through violation of his fiduciary obligation not to divulge
confidential information belonging to his employer,a and to third parties
who have received and used this information with notice.4 Another, and
perhaps more widely used device of equity to prevent revelation and use
of confidential information, is the injunction.5 Basically the same
rules apply to both, the difference being whereas the constructive trust
is restitutional, the injunction is preventive. It is not unusual to see
the two used in conjunction.0 The injunction, as so used, is not a recent
innovation. It was used as early as 1820 when Lord Eldon enjoined the
use of secret veterinary formulae by a third party, where the secret had
been acquired by an employee.7
The rule that one in a fiduciary capacity is disabled from revealing
the secrets belonging to his employer is deceptively simple. In applying
the rule, however, three main problems of construction arise, namely:
(1) What information is secret and confidential; (2) When is an em-
ployee in a confidential or fiduciary capacity; and (3) What is the dura-
tion of the disability? Due to the wide diversity of employer-employee
relationhips, and the myriad types of information with which they are
concerned, it is impossible to give an answer that is more than a wide
generalization. It is suggested that whether or not information is
'Engelstein v. Mintz, 345 Ill. 48, 177 N. E. 746 (1931); 3 BOGERT, TRusTs
AND TRusTrnS, § 471 (1946).
'Harrison v. Craver, 188 Mo. 590, 87 S. W. 962 (1905) ("Assuming the
fiduciary relation it is an elementary law not needing citation of authority that an
employee ... may not seize benefits with both hands, coming and going.').
'Pratt v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 100 F. 2d 833 (2th Cir. 1937), RESTATEMENT,
R.sTiTU N, § 201 (1939).
'Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30, 23 N. E. 12 (1889); 2 STORY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, § 1283 (1918) ("Courts of equity will restrain a party from
making disclosures of secrets communicated to him in the course of a confidential
employment; and it matters not, . . . , whether the secret be a secret of trade, or
secret to title, or any other secret of the party important to his interests.").
After its disclosure equity will enjoin its use by third parties. Stewart v.
Hook, 118 Ga. 445, 45 S. E. 369 (1903); Elaterite Paint and Mfg. Company v.
S. E. Frost Company, 105 Minn. 239, 117 N. W. 338 (1906); Vulcan Detinning
Company v. American Can Company, 75 N. J. Eq. 542, 73 Atl. 603 (Err. & App.
1909).
'Consolidated Boiler Company v. Bogue Elec. Co., 141 N. J. Eq. 550, 58
A. 2d 759 (Ch. 1948); Vulcan Detinning Company v. American Can Company,
75 N. J. Eq. 542, 73 Atl. 603 (Err. & App. 1909).
Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 J. & W. 394, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (1820). In an earlier
case, Newberry v. James, 2 Mer. 446, 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1817), Lord Eldon
refused to grant an injunction, saying: "If the art and method were a secret, the
court could not without having it discl6sed ascertain whether it had been in-
fringed." This has been handled in the American courts by taking the evidence
in the. presence of the parties only, and sealing it for later use for determining if
the decree of the court has been violated. Taylor Iron Company v. Nichols, 73
N. J. Eq. 684. 69 Atl. 186 (Err. & App. 1908). Such disclosure does not act as
a waiver of the secret. Stone v. Goss, 65 N. J. Eq. 756, 55 AtI. 736 (Err. & App.
1903).
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secret is a fact which must be proven.8 It is not necessary, however,
that the information be an absolute secret.9 Ordinarily the term "con-
fidential information" is understood to mean a secret process or formula,
tool, compound or mechanism known only to its owner and those of his
employees in whom it is necessary to confide for its profitable utilization,
in contradistinction to "mere privacy" with which a business is usually
cloaked.10 Once it is accepted that it is a wise public policy to protect
such secrets, it does no violence to the idea to extend the protection
to other types of information which are peculiar to, and essential to
the owner's business. Authorities disagree as to whether this pro-
tection should be extended so as to include customer lists.1 It has been
held that where physical lists are used, they are included, but where
the knowledge is in the employee's memory, it is not, and cannot be the
property of the employer, and is excluded. 1 2  Illustrative, but not
limitative of the generalized types of information which have been held
to be confidential are geological data,' 3 customer lists,14 office methods and
techniques,' 5 credit ratings,'6 future stock trading plans,17 production
methods and manufacturing processes,' 8 business oppportunities, 19 chem-
ical formulae, 20 insurance debits and expiration dates,21 and a code sys-
tem showing cost and selling prices of merchandise.22 The mere fact
that the owner considers it to be secret is not controlling, and though it
be in fact secret, it must have a relationship to the activity of the em-
' Sanitas Nut Food Company v. Cemer, 134 Mich. 370, 96 N. W. 454 (1903) ;
Newark Cleaning and Dye Works v. Gross, 97 N. J. Eq. 406, 128 Atl. 789 (Ch.
1925) (An injunction will not lie in the absence of the actual proof of the secrecy
of the knowledge in question).
'Vulcan Detinning Company v. American Can Company, 75 N. J. Eq. 542, 73
Atl. 603 (Err. & App. 1909).
" National Tube Company v. Eastern Tube Company, 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. 468
(1902).
I Held to be trade secrets: Mackenchnie Bread Company v. Huber, 213 Pac.
285 (Cal. App. 1923); Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 130 Pac.
1180 (1913) ; Witkop and Holmes v. Boyce, 61 Misc. 126, 112 N. Y. Supp. 1076
(Sup. Ct. 1900). Not trade secrets: El Dorado Laundry Company v. Ford, 174
Ark. 104, 294 S. W. 393 (1927); Fulton Grand Laundry Company v. Johnson,
140 Mo. 359, 117 AUt. 753 (1922).
" Garst v. Scott, 114 Kan. 676, 220 Pac. 277 (1923). (If the list is obtained
by mere observation it is not secret.). Fulton Grand Laundry v. Johnson, 140
Mo. 359, 117 At. 753 (1922).
"See note 1 supra.
McKenchnie Bread Company v. Huber, 213 Pac. 285 (Cal. App. 1923);
Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95. 130 Pac. 1180 (1913) ; Witkop
and Holmes v. Boyce, 61 Misc. 126, 112 N. Y. Supp. 874 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
"Tolman v. Mulcahy, 119 App. Div. 42. 103 N. Y. Supp. 936 (1907).Friedman v. Stewart Credit Corp.. 26 N. Y. S. 2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
' Brophy v. Cities Service Corp., 70 A. 2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949).
18 State v. Kirkwood. 357 Mo. 325. 208 S. W. 2d 257 (1948); Irving Iron
Works v. Kerlow Steel Flooring Co., 103 N. J. Eq. 240, 143 Atl. 145 (Ch. 1928).
" Volk Company v. Fleschner Bros., 60 N. Y. S. 2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
-o Marcalus Mfg. Co. v. Sullivan, 142 N. J. Eq. 434, 60 A. 2d 330 (Ch. 1948);
Eastman Company v. Reichenback, 20 N. Y. Supo. 110 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
"Morrison v. Woodbury, 105 Kan. 617, 185 Pac. 735 (1919).
"Simmons Hardware Company v. Waibel, 1 S. D. 488, 47 N. W. 814 (1891).
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ployer.23  A fortiori, information which is of a nature known generally
to the trade, or which is readily obtainable elsewhere is not confidential.
While a mere employee is not usually thought to be in a fiduciary
relation to his employer, if he comes into possession of secrets relating
to his employer's business, he occupies a position of trust analogous in
most respects to that of a fiduciary and is governed accordingly.2 4 This
rule has been applied to a secretary who learned his employer's future
stock trading plans ;25 to a book-keeper privy to the company's loan
procedures ;26 to a store manager in possession of customer credit
ratings;27 industrial chemists in possession of secret formulae ;28 an
engineer supervising production methods ;20 to route salesmen in posses-
sion of customer lists.30 It has also been applied to insurance agents,8 '
and to a tannery employee who knew his employer's secret process for
making leather.32  In an interesting early case it was applied to a stu-
dent who was enjoined from publishing his professor's lectures for out-
side sale."3
The duty not to divulge confidential information is said to be con-
tractual. Courts differ as to whether the contract must be express84
or may be implied from the nature of the employment.85 The basis for
the protection is said to be the employer's property right therein, 0 and
in some cases, as in customer lists, it is spoken of as "good-will" be-
longing to the business.3 7  This duty is said to exist after the termina-
23 Young v. Bradley, 142 F. 2d 658 (6th Cir. 1944).
24 Brophy v. Cities Service Corp., 70 A. 2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949).
25 Brophy v. Cities Service Corp., 70 A. 2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949) (constructive
trust).2 Tolman v. Mulcahy, 119 App. Div. 42, 103 N. Y. Supp. 936 (1907) (in-
junction).
2" Friedman v. Stewart Credit Corp., 26 N. Y. S. 2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (in-
junction).
See note 20 s.pra.
29 State v. Kirkwood, 357 Mo. 325, 208 S. W. 2d 257 (1948); Irving Iron
Works v. Kerlow Steel Flooring Co., 103 N. J. Eq. 240, 143 Atl. 145 (Ch. 1928)(constructive trust).
20 See note 14 supra.
31 Morrison v. Woodbury, 105 Kan. 617, 185 Pac. 735 (1919) (injunction).
" Solomon v. Hertz, 40 N. J. Eq. 400, 2 Atl. 379 (Err. & App. 1886) (in-
junction).
" Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. 0. S. 209 (1825) (injunction).
'Fulton Grand Laundry v. Johnson, 140 Md. 359, 117 At1. 753 (1922)
"2 ("There is an implied contract."). Emn~re Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165
Cal. 95, 130 Pac. 1180 (1913).. ("But an employee cannot be prevented from using
his skill, knowledge or experience even if gained during his employment....
If he is not informed that the process (or information) is secret, he cannot b6
said to have impliedly undertaken anything in connection with the secrecy of the
process.") 187 L. T. 301 (1939).
"0 Du Pont Powder Company v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100 (1917) ("The word
'property' as applied to trade secrets is an unanalysed expression of certain
secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some elementary
requirements of good faith.").
" Colonial Laundries v. Henry, 138 Atl. 47 (R. I. 1927).
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tion of the employment as well as during its continuance38 If held
otherwise the employer would be at the mercy of an unscrupulous em-
ployee, who on receipt of a given trade secret could decamp with im-
punity. While authorities are generally silent as to how long this duty
continues after the termination of the employment, it is reasonable to
assume that the duty will be said to exist as long as revelation or use
of such information has the power to harm the owner 9
In the principal case it was urged, unsuccessfully, that defendant's
loyalty was relaxed as to information of areas in which the plaintiff
was no longer interested. The court intimated that such defense might
be made if it could be proven that such areas of interest had been
abandoned. It has been held, however, that the employee may not be
the judge of what his employer may or may not be interested,40 and a
constructive trust has been decreed as to property of a type only oc-
casionally purchased by the plaintiff, where there was no showing that
he would have in fact purchased the property. 41
The extension of the rule42 to the more mundane kind of employees
and to the less technical types of information is a salutary example of
the development of the conscience of business. 48
JosEPa P. HENNESSEE
Venue-Waiver Under Non-Resident Motorist Statutes
B of Texas was injured by the allegedly negligent operation of an
automobile by A of New York in the State of Vermont. Service was
made on the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in accordance with the
provisions of the Vermont non-resident motorist statute,' and suit com-
menced in the federal district court sitting in Vermont. The court
denied defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to satisfy the federal
"
8 Wooley's Laundry v. Silva, 304 Mass. 383, 23 N. E. 2d 899 (1939); State
v. Kirk-wood, 357 Mo. 325, 208 S. W. 2d 257 (1948).
" It has been held, however, that it is not necessary that the owner should have
suffered any actual loss. Pratt v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 100 F. 2d 833 (9th Cir.
1937).
oPratt v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 100 F. 2d 833 (9th Cir. 1937).
"Whitten v. Wright, 206 Minn. 423, 289 N. W. 509 (1940).
42 See notes 3 through 6 supra.
"But see, Simpson, Equity, Annual Survey of American Law, 839 (1946).
("In view of the ease with which any business practice can be labeled 'confidential,'
and of the fact that enforcement of covenants not to compete by employees is
justified only where the interest of the former employer materially outweighs both
the public interest in free competition and in the dissemination of useful knowledge,
and the employee's interest in being able to learn and apply his skill to his own
advantage, all these decisions (as to confidential information) seem dubious. Cer-
tainly the tendency which they manifest cannot be extended if freedom of in-
dividual enterprise is to be preserved. A fictional extension of the 'trade secret'
concept should not be allowed to become the tool of monopoly.").
I VT. REV. STAT. § 428 (1947), as amended Vt. Public Acts, 1951, § 209.
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